The return of piracy off Somalia’s northeastern coast is triggering an increasingly heated debate among Somalis online. Across TikTok and X, one question keeps coming up: if Puntland has the security capacity to fight Al-Shabaab in some of the region’s most difficult terrain, why does it appear unable or unwilling—to stop pirates operating from the same general area?
Much of the criticism is being directed at Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and his administration. The argument is not simply that piracy has returned. What is attracting attention is where it is returning and the apparent absence of a response proportionate to the threat.
Puntland’s security forces have demonstrated significant operational capacity before. In areas such as Suuj and Garmaal, Puntland forces fought Al-Shabaab militants in difficult terrain and pushed them out. That history has become central to the current debate. If the administration can mobilize troops, intelligence, and logistics against an entrenched militant organization, critics ask why comparatively small pirate groups appear able to operate along the coastline.
That does not automatically prove that Puntland supports or protects piracy. There is an important difference between evidence and suspicion. Piracy networks can operate through remote coastal communities, informal financing systems and small maritime groups that are difficult to detect before they strike.
Still, Puntland adminstartion faces legitimate questions.
Why has the response appeared limited? Are authorities struggling with surveillance and maritime enforcement? Are economic interests within coastal communities complicating enforcement? Is there a political calculation involved? Or is the administration simply underestimating how quickly a small number of hijackings can damage Somalia’s international reputation?
These questions matter far beyond Puntland.
Somalia spent years trying to escape the image of a country synonymous with piracy. A renewed wave of hijackings could increase insurance costs, attract additional foreign naval deployments, and once again place Somali waters at the center of an international maritime-security crisis.
There is also a reputational issue for Puntland itself. If piracy is concentrated within territory under its administration, authorities cannot simply treat it as somebody else’s problem. Control of territory comes with responsibility for what emerges from that territory.
At the same time, claims that Puntland is deliberately allowing piracy for political or economic reasons require evidence. Without documented links between officials and pirate networks, such allegations should remain questions for investigation rather than conclusions presented as fact.
That leaves Puntland with a straightforward challenge: demonstrate publicly that piracy will not be tolerated.
The strongest response would not be rhetoric. It would be arrests, disruption of financing networks, coastal surveillance, prosecution of organizers, and cooperation with Somalia’s federal maritime authorities and international partners.
Because once pirates resume operations, the story does not remain local for long. One hijacked vessel becomes an international headline, and suddenly an entire country is once again being judged by the actions of a few armed men at sea.
